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\* *William J. Taylor, Jr and James Blackwell, "The ground War in the Gulf" Survival, May/June 1991.*

\*\* *William J. Taylor. JR and James Blackwell.*

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\* *Fort Stewart*  
 \*\* *Georgia*  
 \*\*\* *Bradley*  
 \*\*\*\* *Apache*

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\* *Tornado*  
\*\* *Clemenceou*

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\* *Atropine*

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\* *Dick Cheney*

\*\* *Depleted Uranium Armour*

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\* *William Taft*

\*\* *Military Air-Lift Command(MAC)*

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\* *Rafha*  
\*\* *Task Force Troy*  
\*\*\* *Wadi- al- Batin*



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\*\* *Falklands*  
\*\*\* *Chad*  
\*\*\*\* *Nellis*  
\*\*\*\*\* *Top Gun*



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\* *Fort Irwin*

\*\* *Twinty-Nine Palms*

\*\*\* *Gold Water-Nichola*

\*\*\*\* *Colin Powell*

\*\*\*\*\* *objectives*

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\* *Patriot*

\*\* *Scud*

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\* *Multiple Launch rocket Sgstem.*

\*\* *Humvee*

\*\*\* *Bradly*

\*\*\*\* *Bush Master*

\*\*\*\*\* *Hellfire*

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\* *Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar system(JSTAR)*

\*\* *Global Positioning*

\*\*\* *Airborn Warning and control System*



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\* *Cannae*  
\*\* *Agincourt*  
\*\*\* *Waterloo*  
\*\*\*\* *Somme*  
\*\*\*\*\* *Normandy*

1- the authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of the research team of the CSIS Political-Military studies programme, with special recognition of research assistants Greg Grant and Jeff Shafer.

2- *Strategic Survey 1990-1991* (London: Brassey's for IISS, 1991), p.66.

3- In testimony before the US House of Representatives Committee on armed services, Gen. Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said it could be as late as mid-February before US troops would have full capability to launch an offensive.

4- Much of the following analysis is taken from the after-action reports of the 1st Armored Division (Mech), 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (Mech), the 2<sup>nd</sup> Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Armored Division and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Division, which were provided to the authors.

5- For further details, see R.A. Mason, "The Air War in the Gulf," in this issue of *Survival*.

6- *Strategic Survey*, op. cit. in note 2, p.76.

7- *Ibid.*

8- *San Francisco Chronicle*, 1 March 1991; *Defense News*, 4 March 1991; *Prince Bandar of the Defence Ministry*; Col. Trevor Depuy.

9- Statement by Admiral (ret) William J. Crowe, Jr US Navy, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 28 November 1990.

10- Statement by Edward N. Luttwak, before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 29 November 1990.



*11- Briefing by Gen. Merrill Mcpeak, Air Force Chief of Staff, □The Air Campaign: part of the Combined Arms Operation, 15 March 1991, Washington D C.*