نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 امیرآباد شمالی، بلوار آزادگان، خیابان ۱۸ (شهید زره پوش)، روبروی آژانس صدف، پلاک ۳۰ طبقه پنجم شرقی
2 دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
According to some analytic bases, a country possessing advanced uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing technology as well as heavy water technology has achieved “latent nuclear deterrence” because it can build nuclear weapons in short time. Building or not building nuclear weapons depends on the “political will” of that country’s leaders.
If the structure of the international system, security environment and the elite threat perceptions change, their decision will also be subject to change.
The key goal of this article is to respond to this question: What has been, in the eyes of Iranian decision-makers, the impact of “latent nuclear deterrence” strategy on the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran?
The research method is “qualitative” and is of “applied” research. It has employed the theory of “neoclassical realism.”
Findings of this article show that, in the opinion of Iranian elites and decision-makers, the strategy of “latent nuclear deterrence” has been effective in preventing full-scale military invasion of enemies against Iran and has increased Iran’s bargaining power in the face of Western security demands.
This research concludes that, based on Iranian polity’s understanding, this strategy can, under specific circumstances, prevent the full-fledged military invasion of enemy but doesn’t prevent less serious conflicts. It’s a temporary strategy, losing its effectiveness in the long term upon changes in the security environment and elite threat perceptions, thus increasing its chance of failure.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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